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This article investigates empirically whether foreign and domestic credit rating agencies 
tightened their standards for evaluating Japanese regional banks from 2000 to 2009. We 
extend and enhance previous studies, including Gonis and Taylor (2009), by estimating an 
ordered probit model using pooled data for this period. Our results reveal that foreign 
agencies did not rate Japanese regional banks more stringently during this period, perhaps 
because they wished not to repel clients and reduce their revenues. Japan’s rating agencies 
showed the opposite tendency, perhaps to seek credibility among foreign investors. 
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I. Introduction  
 
Investors and depositors rely on credit ratings for selecting securities and choosing a bank. 
Without doubt, credit ratings are convenient; the issue is whether they are reliable. After all, 
rating agencies are paid by the firms they rate, and securitizations of subprime loans that 
provoked a global financial crisis routinely carried investment-grade ratings. Since the 
subprime and Lehman shocks, regulation of financial institutions has become more stringent 
worldwide, and hence the question arises whether rating agencies have become more stringent 
in evaluating financial institutions. The question is germane in Japan where the unfreezing of 
payout limits makes reliable credit ratings essential for depositors to gauge their banks’ 
soundness.  
 This article investigates whether US and Japanese rating agencies became more stringent 
in assessing creditworthiness of Japan’s primary regional financial institutions—first-tier and 
second-tier regional banks. We build on and extend previous studies, including Gonis and 
Taylor (2009), by estimating an ordered probit model using pooled data for 2000–2009, the 
period when regulation of financial institutions became more stringent worldwide. 
Section II reviews previous studies. Section III discusses data and methodologies. Section 
IV presents and interprets the empirical results. Section V summarizes and concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Ordered probit models have been used to test many types of hypotheses (Miyata, 2003; 
Gascoigne and Turner, 2004; Grund and Gürtler, 2005 and Huang and Lin, 2006). Brooks and 
Naylor (2008) 1  determined that firm size and business risk had positive and negative 
influences, respectively, on Morningstar® equity ratings in 2005.2
                                                  
1  Poon (2003), and Ashbaugh–Skaife, Collins and LaFond (2006) also analyzed the 
determinants of ranks of credit ratings. 
2 Pottier and Sommer (1999) investigated the determinants of credit ratings of US insurers and 
found that A.M. Best, Moody’s and S&P awarded higher ratings to larger insurers and lower 
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Blume, Lim and MacKinlay (1998) revealed that more stringent rating standards 
explained part of the decline in S&P credit ratings of US firms from 1978 to 1995. Using data 
from 1988 to 1999, Doherty and Phillips (2002) demonstrated that the downtrend in A.M. 
Best’s ratings of property-liability insurers was consistent with increased stringency.  
Using data from 1987 to 1999, Pottier and Sommer (2003) showed that A.M. Best and 
S&P had become more stringent in evaluating credit ratings of life insurers.3  
Gonis and Taylor (2009) investigated whether downgrades in UK corporate credit ratings 
reflected deteriorating creditworthiness or greater stringency by rating agencies. Applying 
analytical methods of Blume and MacKinlay (1998), Doherty and Phillips (2002) and Pottier 
and Sommer (2003) to data from 1999 to 2004, they estimated the ordered probit model 
including year dummies, as did previous studies, and concluded that both factors influenced 
downgrading in the UK.  
 




We take credit ratings of each bank as a dependent variable and estimate the ordered 
probit model, following previous studies, including Gonis and Taylor (2009). Data included 
pooled data of Japanese regional banks from 2000 to 2009. We assign numerical scores to 
credit ratings: 9 for AAA, AA+ (Aaa, Aa1), 8 for AA (Aa2), 7 for AA− (Aa3), 6 for A+ (A1), 
5 for A (A2), 4 for A− (A3), 3 for BBB+ (BBB1), 2 for BBB (BBB2), 1 for BBB− (BBB3) 
and 0 for ratings below BBB− (BBB3).4
We select independent variables based on Gonis and Taylor (2009), considering variables 
used in previous studies and factors that rating agencies consider in evaluating 
creditworthiness. 
                                                                                                                                        
ratings to insurers that invested in junk bonds. 
3 Only data from 1990 and 1999 were used for S&P because of data restrictions. 
4 The ranks of credit ratings in parentheses are those of Moody’s. 
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Asset is the total assets of each bank and a proxy measure of size. If larger banks enjoy 
economies of scale or other efficiencies and receive high credit ratings, the coefficient of this 
variable will be positive. Financially sound small banks might also receive high ratings. This 
variable is converted into a natural logarithm. 
Leverage is capital leverage of each bank and a proxy measure of underlying financial 
soundness. It is reasonable to surmise that banks with adequate capital bases would receive 
high ratings because they have a greater risk cushion. This coefficient should be negative. 
Cash is the ratio of cash and notes due from banks to total assets of each bank. It is a 
proxy measure of immediate liquidity. Banks with superior liquidity can better withstand 
emergencies. If those banks receive high credit ratings, this coefficient will be positive. 
Bond-Call is the ratio of call loans and government bonds to total assets of each bank. It is 
a proxy measure for assets, second only to Cash in liquidity and credit risk. If banks holding 
higher percentages of near-cash assets also have higher credit ratings, this coefficient will be 
positive. 
Stock is the ratio of equities among each bank’s total assets. It is a proxy measure of 
exposure to market risk and liquidity risk, which are greater for equities than are default-free 
assets such as government bonds. If rating agencies interpret holdings of equities as harboring 
risk, this coefficient should be negative. 
Nonperform is each bank’s non-performing loan ratio. Banks with an outsized ratio 
presumably are not managing risks well. Their capital bases could be impaired and their 
financial soundness threatened if they must dispose of non-performing loans. This coefficient 
will be negative. 
ROA indicates profitability. Highly profitable banks can expand their capital base. If rating 
agencies value that ability, the coefficient of ROA should be significantly positive. However, 
highly profitable banks might engage in riskier businesses.5 If rating agencies judge that to be 
the case, this coefficient will not necessarily be positive. 
                                                  
5 Cantor and Packer (1997) mentioned that if ex ante uncertainties about default risk of firms 
whose leverage and ROA are high become greater, they might voluntarily seek credit ratings 
to decrease uncertainties about their default risks. 
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Concentration is the Herfindahl index for each prefecture. It is calculated based on the 
loans and discounted bills of first-tier regional banks, second-tier regional banks and credit 
associations in each prefecture. It is a proxy for concentration of regional markets. If agencies 
perceive that banks operating in concentrated markets cannot raise margins and profits, the 
coefficient of this variable will be positive; if agencies perceive regional concentration implies 
opportunities for small profits and nimble returns, this coefficient will be significant and 
negative. 
Share is the share of loans and bills discounted of a bank to the sum of them in the 
prefecture where that bank is headquartered. It is a proxy of regional share. In general, banks 
with a high share of their regional market have more stable profits. The coefficient of this 
variable will be positive. 
Tax is each prefecture’s revenue from local taxes and is a proxy of a regional market’s 
economic vitality.6 If rating agencies believe banks in well-off regions can raise profits easily, 
the coefficient of this variable will be positive. This variable is converted into a natural 
logarithm. 
Year dummies from 2001 to 2009—Dum2001 to Dum2009—are added in the estimated 
model. Our concern is how values of these coefficients will change. If the value is smaller 
(higher) than it was in the previous year, ratings were presumably more stringent (less 




Descriptive statistics for credit ratings appear in Table 1.7
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Credit Ratings 
                                                  
6 Prefectural GDP is preferable to Tax as a proxy variable of economic vitality. However, 
because prefectural GDP for 2009 had not been released at the time of our study, we use data 
for local taxes as a proxy of prefectural GDP. 
7 We calculated them by the sample including unsolicited credit ratings. 
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 Foreign rating agencies are believed to be more stringent than are Japanese rating agencies. 
That belief is borne out by comparing the averages in Table 1. The highest rating granted by 
Moody’s, JCR and R&I was AA (or A2), whereas that for S&P was AA−. Therefore, Japanese 
regional banks might hesitate to ask foreign agencies for credit ratings. 
The average credit ratings per year for each rating agency are shown in Fig.1. 
 
Fig. 1 Average Credit Ratings 
 
Among foreign agencies, S&P’s average ratings increased after 2003 and those of 
Moody’s increased after 2004. Among Japanese agencies, JCR’s average ratings dropped from 
2000 to 2008, and those of R&I decreased from 2000 to 2003 and from 2008 to 2009. 
Although R&I’s average rating increased from 2004 to 2007, its span of increase is less 
than it is for S&P and for Moody’s. This may be because Japan’s financial system had been 
unstable throughout the decade preceding the early 2000s and had recovered. This evidence 
suggests that domestic agencies became more stringent in their ratings. 
Ratios of ratings revisions for the sample period are shown from Tables 2 to 5. 
 
Table 2 S&P’s Ratings Revisions (%) 
Table 3 Moody’s Ratings Revisions (%) 
Table 4 JCR’s Ratings Revisions (%) 
Table 5 R&I’s Ratings Revisions (%) 
 
We find scarcely any years after the mid-2000s in which S&P and Moody’s downgraded 
ratings of regional banks, and the ratio of upgrades is larger, especially for S&P. Conversely, 
we find downgrades by JCR and R&I even after the mid-2000s, when Japan’s financial 
system and economic condition had recovered. Moreover, the ratio of their upgrades is much 
smaller than it is for S&P. Thus, it seems possible that Japanese agencies’ ratings of regional 
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banks became more stringent. Descriptive statistics of independent variables are in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
 
Data on credit ratings of each bank are from the CD-ROM of ‘Four Seasons Reports on 
Companies’ in the summer issue of each year (Kaisya Shikiho), edited by Toyo Keizai. Data 
for financial statements of individual banks are taken from the Nikkei NEEDS. Data absent in 
Nikkei NEEDS is supplemented from the ‘Analysis of Financial Statements of All Banks’ 
edited by the Japanese Bankers Association. Prefectural data is obtained from the ‘Financial 
Resources of a Nation’ (Minryoku) edited by Asahi Newspaper. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 
Results of foreign credit rating agencies 
 
We take the credit ratings of S&P and Moody’s as dependent variables and estimate. 
Results appear in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 Estimation Results of Foreign Credit Rating Agencies 
 
Pseudo-R2 values in the model including year dummies are 0.352 for S&P and 0.357 for 
Moody’s. Those in the model without year dummies are 0.303 for S&P and 0.319 for 
Moody’s. It seems apparent that ratings stringency did vary across the sample period. 
As for results of independent variables, the coefficients of Leverage for S&P and Moody’s 
are significantly negative at 1%. Banks with sound financial positions received higher ratings, 
as expected. 
While coefficients of Stock are negative and significant at 1% for both agencies, 
coefficients of Bond-Call are significantly positive at 1% for S&P and at 5% for Moody’s. It 
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seems that these proxies reflect important considerations in evaluating credit ratings: banks 
that held substantial equity positions received lower ratings, whereas banks that held many 
government bonds and call loans received higher ratings. 
The coefficients of Nonperform are significantly negative at 1% for S&P and at 5% for 
Moody’s. This finding was expected for reasons explained in Section III. 
Coefficients of Concentration are negative and significant at 1% for both agencies, 
indicating that banks in competitive markets received higher ratings. Apparently, rating 
agencies appreciated these banks’ competitive opportunities, and lower margins were not 
negatives.  
Coefficients of Share are significantly positive at 1% for both rating agencies. They 
apparently endorsed the advantages of having larger shares in regional markets through higher 
ratings. 
The coefficient of Asset is positive and significant at 1% for S&P and significantly 
negative at 1% for Moody’s. Perhaps S&P recognized larger banks’ economies of scale, and 
Moody’s awarded higher ratings to sound banks even if they were small.  
The coefficient of ROA for Moody’s is negative and significant at 5%. Perhaps Moody’s 
awarded lower ratings to banks that pursue immediate profits through higher-risk business. 
The coefficient of Cash for S&P is significantly positive at 1%, as is the coefficient of Tax 
for Moody’s. Both results were anticipated in Section III. 
Year dummies from 2006 to 2009 for S&P are significantly positive at 1%, and their 
values rose yearly, intimating that S&P might have awarded softer ratings since 2006. To 
confirm, we re-estimated the model after excluding banks with unsolicited ratings.8 Although 
we omitted the table for brevity, there were no years in that estimation where coefficients of 
year dummies were smaller than they were in the previous year. Year dummies from 2007 to 
2009 for Moody also are positive and significant, and values for 2007 and 2009 exceed those 
of previous years. This estimation, too, reveals no tendency towards more stringent ratings. 
                                                  
8 Between 2000 and 2003, a large number of banks received unsolicited credit ratings than 
they did during other years in the sample period. As far as possible, we sought to make the 
number of observed samples for each year identical. 
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Therefore, evidence suggests that neither Moody’s nor S&P’s ratings became more stringent 
during the period. Financial markets believe that foreign agencies evaluate Japanese firms 
more critically than do Japanese rating agencies; knowing this, these foreign credit agencies 
might have held back, fearing loss of fee income if they frightened away potential clients 
among Japanese regional banks.  
 
Results of domestic credit rating agencies 
 
We now take the ratings of JCR and R&I as dependent variables and estimate. Table 8 
presents the results. 
 
Table 8 Estimation Results of Domestic Credit Rating Agencies 
 
Pseudo-R2 values in the model featuring year dummies are 0.360 for JCR and 0.498 for 
R&I. Values in the model without year dummies are 0.320 for JCR and 0.446 for R&I. 
Results suggest that rating stringency varied across the sample period in these estimations as 
well. 
For independent variables, the coefficients of Leverage are negative and significant at 1% 
for both Japanese agencies. Coefficients of Bond-Call are positive and significant at 1% for 
R&I and significant at 5% for JCR. These results are the same as in Table 7. Domestic 
agencies also regard sound financial positions and intensities of risks as important when 
assigning ratings. 
Coefficients of Asset and Share are positive and significant at 1% for Japanese agencies. 
Both gave high ratings to larger banks and to banks with larger shares in their regional 
markets, as did their US counterparts. 
The coefficient of Stock for R&I is negative and significant at 1%, as is the coefficient of 
Nonperform for JCR. The coefficient of ROA for JCR is negative and significant at 1%, as are 
coefficients of Concentration for both Japanese agencies. These results were expected in 
 8
Section III and show signs similar to the estimation results for foreign agencies. 
Contrary to expectations in Section III, the coefficient of Tax for R&I is negative and 
significant at 1%. Perhaps results were influenced by lower ratings on banks operating where 
economic scales are large but where financial systems were unstable around 2000—notably 
Osaka prefecture. 
Coefficients of all year dummies for JCR are negative. Those from 2004 to 2008 are 
significantly negative—at 10% for 2004 and at 1% for the other years—and their values 
decrease yearly. This result suggests that JCR’s ratings were more stringent after 2004, 
confirming tendencies reported by Gonis and Taylor (2009) and others. To counter criticisms 
that Japanese agencies rate Japanese firms more leniently than do foreign agencies, JCR 
might have tightened its ratings to gain credibility among foreign investors. 
All coefficients of year dummies for R&I are significantly negative. Notably, their values 
from 2001 to 2005 decreased yearly. On this basis, we conclude that R&I’s ratings of regional 
banks also became more stringent. Although coefficients of year dummies from 2006 tend to 
be slightly larger than of previous years, all of their values were smaller compared to those 





This study empirically investigated whether US and Japanese credit rating agencies 
became more stringent towards Japanese regional banks from 2000 to 2009, when regulations 
to financial institutions became more stringent worldwide. 
First, we documented revisions in credit ratings and found it likely that Japanese agencies 
became more stringent, considering that Japan’s financial system and economy had recovered 
since the mid-2000s. 
Second, ordered probit models including year dummies were estimated. Results revealed 
that foreign rating agencies did not adopt more stringent standards toward Japanese regional 
 9
banks. Perhaps they wished to avoid scaring off the Japanese clients and losing revenues. 
Unlike foreign rating agencies, Japanese agencies did adopt more stringent 
standards—since the mid-2000s for JCR and until the mid-2000s for R&I. R&I continued to 
apply more stringent standards than they did in 2000, even after 2006. They, perhaps, hoped 
to improve their credibility among the foreign investors.  
It remains for future scholarship to investigate whether ratings of Japan’s non-bank 
industries, especially by Japanese agencies, have become more stringent and whether trends 
found in this study persist. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Credit Ratings 
 S&P Moody’s JCR R&I 
Mean 3.017 3.705 4.951 5.273 
Maximum 7 8 8 8 
Minimum 0 0 0 1 
SD 1.550 1.852 1.477 1.605 
Observations 291 224 386 278 
 























Table 2 S&P’s Ratings Revisions (%) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Upgrades 8.1  0.0  2.2 42.1 47.6 38.1 45.0  4.8  0.0 
Downgrades 8.1  15.0  0.0 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  4.5 
Maintain 83.8  85.0  97.8 47.4 52.4 61.9 55.0  95.2  95.5 
 
Table 3 Moody’s Ratings Revisions (%) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Upgrades 0.0  0.0  0.0 14.8 8.3 14.3 100.0  0.0  0.0 
Downgrades 6.9  24.1  25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
Maintain 93.1  75.9  75.0 85.2 91.7 85.7 0.0  100.0  100.0 
 
Table 4 JCR’s Ratings Revisions (%) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Upgrades 4.2  0.0  6.9 0.0 14.3 12.5 7.0  3.8  22.2 
Downgrades 8.3  15.4  20.7 3.6 0.0 2.5 0.0  34.6  7.4 
Maintain 87.5  84.6  72.4 96.4 85.7 85.0 93.0  61.5  70.4 
 
Table 5 R&I’s Ratings Revisions (%) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Upgrades 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 11.1 10.3 21.4  6.7  3.3 
Downgrades 9.1  31.8  3.8 6.9 0.0 0.0 3.6  6.7  10.0 








Table 6 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
 Asset Leverage Cash Bond-Call Stock Nonperform ROA 
 Mean  3243300  2152.674  3.731  11.568  2.442  5.465  0.062 
 Maximum  11693332  10754.96  14.826  25.941  9.926  15.275  1.110 
 Minimum  464583  1131.210  0.935  1.8146  0.308  1.667 −2.939 
 SD  2067116  726.482  2.007  4.102  1.341  2.371  0.445 
Observations  647  647  647  647  647  647  647
 
Concentration Share Tax 
 3813.318  44.011  460095 
 7781.829  87.923  5497272
 460.368  3.170  55872 
 1503.891  22.731  833879 

















Table 7 Estimation Results of Foreign Credit Rating Agencies 
  S&P Moody’s 
  Coefficient (z-value) Coefficient (z-value) 
Constant −3.987 (−1.258) 25.760*** (4.952) 
Asset 0.853*** (2.762) −2.269*** (−4.642) 
Leverage −0.002*** (−7.442) −0.003*** (−10.051) 
Cash 0.113*** (2.704) −0.077 (−1.646) 
Bond-Call 0.065*** (3.140) 0.060** (2.387) 
Stock −0.225*** (−3.597) −0.405*** (−5.373) 
Nonperform −0.126*** (−2.686) −0.115** (−2.219) 
ROA −0.103 (−0.314) −0.564** (−1.975) 
Concentration −0.001*** (−5.982) −0.002*** (−8.224) 
Share 0.051*** (4.331) 0.148*** (8.074) 
Tax −0.214 (−1.016) 1.486*** (5.171) 
Dum2001 −0.049 (−0.169) −0.373 (−1.255) 
Dum2002 −0.074 (−0.253) −0.373 (−1.192) 
Dum2003 −0.072 (−0.247) −0.400 (−1.269) 
Dum2004 0.249 (0.775) −0.456 (−1.528) 
Dum2005 0.496 (1.539) −0.515* (−1.697) 
Dum2006 0.960*** (2.806) −0.281 (−0.733) 
Dum2007 1.375*** (3.819) 1.075*** (2.674) 
Dum2008 1.561*** (4.562) 0.832** (2.143) 
Dum2009 1.693*** (4.512) 1.167*** (2.959) 
Upper boundary for rating category 
BBB- 0.067 (1.013) 1.401*** (4.557) 
BBB 2.613*** (11.077) 2.538*** (7.673) 
BBB+ 3.346*** (13.261) 3.769*** (10.626) 
A− 4.411*** (15.975) 5.196*** (13.109) 
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A 6.010*** (17.226) 5.722*** (13.918) 
A+ 6.786*** (15.797) 7.053*** (15.405) 
AA−  7.905*** (15.578) 
Pseudo-R2 0.352 0.357 
Log Likelihood −308.473 −283.352 
Observations  291  224























Table 8 Estimation Results of Domestic Credit Rating Agencies 
  JCR R&I 
  Coefficient (z-value) Coefficient (z-value) 
Constant −1.749 (−0.771) −17.926*** (−6.435) 
Asset 1.184*** (6.285) 2.808*** (9.869) 
Leverage −0.001*** (−11.145) −0.003*** (−11.361) 
Cash 0.027 (0.745) −0.056 (−1.186) 
Bond-Call 0.032** (1.979) 0.086*** (4.653) 
Stock 0.010 (0.153) −0.317*** (−4.551) 
Nonperform −0.218*** (−6.043) 0.009 (0.167) 
ROA −0.859*** (−4.700) 0.296 (0.950) 
Concentration −0.000*** (−2.965) −0.000*** (−4.634) 
Share 0.032*** (4.981) 0.024*** (2.775) 
Tax −0.050 (−0.477) −0.781*** (−4.310) 
Dum2001 −0.249 (−0.791) −0.803** (−2.152) 
Dum2002 −0.246 (−0.790) −1.187*** (−3.165) 
Dum2003 −0.196 (−0.632) −1.300*** (−3.658) 
Dum2004 −0.546* (−1.776) −1.885*** (−5.229) 
Dum2005 −1.055*** (−3.627) −1.934*** (−5.378) 
Dum2006 −1.159*** (−3.984) −1.915*** (−5.102) 
Dum2007 −1.383*** (−4.771) −1.778*** (−4.586) 
Dum2008 −1.730*** (−5.904) −1.356*** (−3.723) 
Dum2009 −1.257*** (−4.128) −0.699* (−1.929) 
Upper boundary for rating category 
BBB− 5.994*** (6.042)  
BBB 7.509*** (7.489) 0.843*** (3.360) 
BBB+ 8.320*** (8.244) 2.673*** (7.278) 
A− 9.733*** (9.429) 4.909*** (11.442) 
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A 11.349*** (10.686) 6.212*** (12.995) 
A+ 12.792*** (11.780) 8.846*** (15.516) 
AA− 13.905*** (12.574) 10.011*** (16.474) 
Pseudo-R2 0.360 0.498 
Log Likelihood −438.262 −239.779 
Observations  386  278
*Significant at 10％; **Significant at 5％; ***Significant at 1％ 
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